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Leiden, The Netherlands

**A history of SNV from a
Zambian perspective
1965-2005**

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ASC Working Paper 95 / 2011

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Introduction

In 2005 SNV Netherlands Development Organisation celebrated its 40th birthday. This was felt to be an appropriate occasion to conduct in-depth research into the socio-cultural history of the organization. The African Studies Centre in Leiden, The Netherlands was commissioned to carry out the study, while having a free hand in formulating the questions and carrying out the research. The results of this research were published under the title: *Bricks, mortar and capacity building. A socio-cultural history of SNV Netherlands Development Organisation* (Brill 2010).

The sources for the study were formed by archival documents and interviews conducted in various countries. Obviously it was impossible to carry out interviews in all countries where SNV had had activities during its history. Therefore seven countries were chosen, on the basis of a range of criteria. Not only had SNV to be present for considerable time in the country, for logistical reasons a current presence in the country. Given the preponderance of African-based activities and the expertise within the African Studies Centre in Leiden, five countries in Africa were selected. In an effort to achieve geographical and linguistic diversity, the choice was finally made as follows: Guinea Bissau, Mali, Cameroon, Tanzania and Zambia. In Latin America and Asia, Bolivia and Nepal were selected. A commissioned local researcher conducted interviews in these countries, studied the archival material available and wrote an essay on SNV's history in the country concerned on the basis of what they had heard and read.

We feel that these reports merit more attention than functioning as source material for the *Bricks, mortar and capacity building* publication. It is for this reason that as African Studies Centre we make the African case studies available for a larger audience in the form of a working paper.

Each commissioned researcher was asked to carry out research with the following questions in mind:

- What were SNV employees' intentions and expectations, and how do they look back on their activities?
- What were the expectations of the communities in which SNV was active and how are SNV activities now evaluated by people from these communities?

With these basic questions the researchers read archival documents and conducted interviews with (former) SNV workers and with people who had been in contact with the organization.

Inge Brinkman
Leiden, July 2011

A History of SNV from a Zambian Perspective 1965-2005

Marja Hinfelaar¹

Introduction

This study is based on the assumption that international lending institutions and NGOs did not shape the history of Zambia despite the definite influence they had on the country. From this premise, the history of SNV in Zambia might be expected to mirror the socio-economic and political developments of Zambia.¹ However if we want to see the SNV from a local perspective, we have to understand the target group and what the local perception of development work was when the SNV arrived in Zambia in 1965. How did changes in government policy and ideology over a period of 40 years affect SNV? And if SNV's goal was to empower Zambians with skills or 'capacity', to what extent did the local socio-economic and political situation allow for this? The history of SNV has, therefore, been divided into the following periods and themes: development projects prior to independence (1945-1964); the rise of a new nation (1964-1972); the nationalisation process and the one-party state (1973-1991); and the liberalisation of the political economy from 1991 onwards. By way of conclusion, the long-term consequences of SNV's activities in Zambia are explored. This study is based on archival research, interviews, fieldwork and secondary literature in Zambia.²

'Progressive Men': Introducing the Concept of Development Work in Colonial Times (1945-1964)³

It has been suggested that the initiation of development projects by the British colonial government was motivated by political expediency, namely to counteract the growth of nationalist movements.⁴ Another of the colonial government's concerns was to encourage people living in the urban areas to return to the land because the absence of young men in the rural areas was resulting in a severe shortfall in agricultural output in areas with high labour migrancy rates.

Kenneth Kaunda, Zambia's first president after independence, was one of the most enthusiastic believers in this development ideology. As chairperson of Chinsali Young Men's Farming Association in the 1950s, he was part of a group that engaged in and contributed to an emerging discourse of development and progress in the 1950s. They genuinely identified with and saw their interests lying within the colonial government's post-war development strategy.⁵ For these young, relatively well-educated men, development projects opened up new avenues for social mobility that were independent of the traditional authorities.

Government policy focused on encouraging successful farming by introducing the African Improved Farmers' Scheme and Peasant Farmers' Programme in productive areas like Central, Eastern and Southern Province. However, these projects affected less than 5% of farmers.⁶ In less-productive areas, like Northern Province, the

¹ National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka: <http://www.zambiarchives.org/>

programmes established large farming 'blocks', consisting of land, housing and implements. These types of government-led development projects failed for the simple reason that farming could not compete with a career in town. The government soon realised that the potential market for agricultural products within the area was limited and transport costs were too high to allow for the export of produce outside the area. Ironically, despite the economic and political failure of these projects, the development concept provided the British government with a way of remaining involved in Zambia after it had achieved political independence. Post-colonial development aid to former colonies gave the British 'a continued sense of their mission in shaping their future'.⁷

The colonial government did not have a monopoly on development projects and throughout Zambia missionaries of all denominations engaged in education, healthcare and agricultural projects. While women received basic education and instruction in health and nutrition, the missionaries expected progressive change to come from the young men and, as a result, they became the focal point of training schemes. From the 1950s onwards, youth movements like the Dutch *Katholieke Arbeiders Jeugd* (popularly known as *Kajotters*) assisted the missionaries in the construction of schools, hospitals and churches.⁸

A Young Man's Nation: The Politics of Development (1964-1972)

Aiding Zambia, which was a rich country in many ways, was a political decision. With a 12% annual growth rate and high copper prices, Zambia did not need outside assistance. In fact in the First National Development Plan, aid amounted to less than 0.8% of the budget (of which 0.4% was actually received).⁹ Wood and Vokes suggest the following reasons as to why Zambia received such favourable treatment from donor organisations: the shortage of technical personnel; a dangerously narrow economic base; and a dualist economy with extensive rural poverty. An additional reason was Zambia's position as a front-line state.¹⁰

President Kaunda was under a lot of pressure. Huge investments were needed in the educational and healthcare sectors to provide services for the whole population and, as a result, public expenditure rose by 20% a year between 1965 and 1970. Politically, Kaunda had to create unity out of a diverse and split country. High expectations of independence, a scramble for political positions, high urban unemployment rates and the resulting tensions posed a serious threat to Kaunda's rule. One way of countering these problems was the 'back to the land' policy that was used as a means of providing employment and controlling the youth. But despite the tensions, it was a time of optimism.¹¹ Like other developing countries, Zambia believed the development orthodoxy 'that foreign aid and investment on favourable terms, the transfer of knowledge of production techniques, measures to promote health and education and economic planning would lead impoverished countries to be able to become "normal" market economies'.¹²

SNV Projects

This is the background against which SNV officially arrived in Zambia in 1965. A contract between the Dutch Embassy and the Zambian government set out the aims of this cooperation.

Under the Netherlands Youth Volunteer Programme and within the limits imposed by the availability of manpower and financial and material resources, the Netherlands government shall place Netherlands volunteers *at the disposal of the Zambian government upon the request of the latter*. [author's emphasis]

The objective of the programme was 'to help train staff by co-operating with the intermediate and lower categories of staff in Zambia'.¹³ Dutch development assistance was clearly aimed at poor subsistence farmers, following the ideal of reducing regional welfare inequalities. As a result, SNV mainly focused its activities in Western, North-Western and Luapula Provinces. By contrast, organisations like the European Union (which was set up later) and the World Bank opted to back 'high return' provinces like Southern and Eastern Provinces.¹⁴

SNV's approach to development work meant that its activities in the early period were seen as having a pioneer spirit and of being of 'bricks and mortar'.¹⁵ In 1966, nine Dutch agricultural advisors arrived to assist the Zambian government with the implementation of its new agricultural policy. The majority of these volunteers were attached to the recently established Zambia Youth Service camps in Katete, Solwezi, Kabwe and Kitwe and while the aim of these camps was to train the youth to become farmers, it soon became clear that the ulterior motive was to enlist them into the UNIP youth movement. A number of former volunteers attest to this:

The youth of the Zambia Youth Service were actually campaign leaders, who would enter the villages to force people to vote for Kaunda's UNIP party. The government promised to reward them for carrying out this work.¹⁶

In response, SNV tried to remain politically neutral.

SNV adjusted itself to the politics of the moment, as it continues to do. SNV cannot influence politics, so they grabbed every opportunity to start a project... SNV's drive was to set up as many projects as possible in Zambia and one can only achieve this by abiding by politics.¹⁷

SNV was forced to impose limits. When these youth service camps 'became a semi-military organisation', SNV pulled out¹⁸ and volunteers were moved to other projects.¹⁹ An additional reason for abandoning these camps was a clash of ideologies – SNV's adherence to the ideal of small-scale farming as opposed to the UNIP's determination to introduce large-scale mechanised farming.²⁰ In 1968, SNV policy focused on integrated rural development, supplying agricultural, health and educational services to certain areas in Luapula, North-Western and Central Provinces.

This type of integrated development was initiated in 1967 by a group of volunteers attached to a resettlement scheme in Kasempa. The 'Rural Training Team' consisted of an agriculturalist, a domestic-science worker, a builder, a nurse, a midwife and a team leader. They soon realised that 'the population in the area tried to keep aloof from too much interference by the government, and it was envisaged that a non-government team might make contact with the people more readily and would inspire confidence'.²¹ Another example of an integrated SNV project was in Monze in Southern Province where the SNV cooperated with the Roman Catholic Church instead of the Zambian government. Monze diocese at the time needed volunteers in the fields of agriculture, education and healthcare and received several through SNV.

One SNV volunteer set up a midwifery training programme at Monze hospital in the early 1970s. Having married locally, she continued to work part-time at the same institute until the late 1980s. Despite numerous clashes between SNV and diocesan staff on religious grounds, the diocese provided a tightly organised structure for the volunteers to work in.²²

As a result of the growing number of volunteers, from an initial nine in 1965 to 45 in 1971,²³ it was felt that more coordination was needed. This led to the establishment of an SNV field office in Zambia and the introduction of a certain hierarchy. The first SNV field director was Wim Zevenbergen, an ex-colonial officer who had worked in the former Dutch colony of New Guinea. Half of the SNV volunteers were nurses and health workers, all of whom were professional women with an average age of about 30. By contrast, the male volunteers – working in Youth Service Camps or providing the government with technical assistance – were in their early twenties. An explanation for this discrepancy could be the fact that men had to fulfil their military service obligations the moment they finished their studies. Working for SNV for a period of three years was considered a valid alternative by the Dutch government.²⁴

To realise the scale of SNV operations, one has to put its contribution in perspective. British Aid, for instance, recruited 3049 technical assistants at its height in 1970.²⁵ Other organisations included the Peace Corps and voluntary organisations from Denmark, Germany, Canada and Norway. In areas where many organisations operated it is doubtful whether the local population would have been able to differentiate between them. While singing the praises of some and condemning others, a nun remembers volunteers ‘who spent the whole night in bars and one group had a car accident because they were racing each other. I am not sure whether that were Dutch volunteers or other nationalities.’²⁶

Personal Experiences and Zambian Responses

Neither the SNV volunteers nor the Zambians can be described as homogenous groups of people. Their encounters were therefore not only a clash of cultures but also a meeting of different generations, backgrounds and, of course, characters. Their experiences also depended on the location: some volunteers were stationed in remote parts of the country where no English was spoken; others worked in town where educational levels were higher. SNV volunteers might have been convinced of their mission when leaving their homelands but many started to have doubts when faced with the complex reality on the ground in Zambia. While expecting to find an ‘extremely primitive society’, as the Dutch ambassador at the time put it, many volunteers expressed surprise at the existence of a ‘proper economy’, which convinced many to settle and start their own business.²⁷

The preparatory courses the volunteers received in the Netherlands prior to their departure did not adequately prepare them for the cultural clash. A missionary priest who went through the same experience expressed it as follows: ‘We were not properly prepared to work with people who had totally different customs, habits and religious beliefs. What did we know about cultures? In our minds culture was related to the arts. For us there was only one way of living, namely the western way. Other parts of the world were underdeveloped.’²⁸ Most volunteers at this time were young and had never travelled outside Europe before going to Zambia. They had to adapt to a simple lifestyle in Zambia: they slept in caravans or huts, drove old cars and

received only a modest income. For some it was a vocation, they were not motivated by a big salary, for others it was an adventure or a way of avoiding military service in the Dutch army.²⁹

All the volunteers agreed that their behaviour could easily have irked Zambians. The bluntness and disdain shown for the local culture and beliefs could easily have led to conflict. Some noted a level of resistance against their interventions.

I used to visit villages of the employees I was working with on the [SNV] project. Once I came to a village and ended up with someone I get along very well at work. But when I came to him he said: you are allowed to come, you are welcome, but I don't want you to try to change my village. That's what we do on the project, but not where I live.³⁰

Looking back on the experience, former volunteers wonder how Zambians were able to accept a situation in which a young and inexperienced volunteer was managing a farm employing 400 labourers.³¹ Conflicts occurred but rarely got out of hand. It remained at the level of small disputes, like 'sometimes we were reproached for having passed a village elder accidentally and not offering a lift'.³² One volunteer, however, was asked to leave SNV after hitting a man who had stolen his bicycle.³³

Meetings called by SNV were generally well attended by the local population, but the volunteers realised that an ulterior motive for their coming could have been 'an element of curiosity, to listen to the new (white) inhabitants, and also the opportunity to express many complaints'.³⁴ In this context the long-standing colonial legacy of the image of Europeans cannot be dismissed. Inevitably, SNV volunteers were associated with former colonial civil servants or commercial farmers and were considered wealthy:

Zambians did not see the difference between us SNV volunteers and the former colonials. If you arrive there as a young bloke and you drive a big Land Rover and can buy whatever you want, even though you were only earning 10 pounds a month, but you could declare these costs. You could do whatever you wanted, somebody was cooking and washing for you, so in the eyes of the local population it did not matter who you were. They looked at us as 'oh, there goes a white person'. You shouldn't have the illusion that they thought we were different from the white farmers, really not. This led to discussions but tensions too.³⁵

It is interesting to note that conflicts between SNV and the local population always revolved round a vehicle. Vehicles became the icons of development work. Many villagers and provincial town people only knew SNV because of the cars that passed by, which could be few and far between. The vehicles created the impression of wealth and status. A Catholic missionary recalls that in the early 1970s it was widely believed that the compensation for a 'SNV pregnancy' (when a local girl became pregnant by an SNV volunteer) was shaped in the form of a second-hand Toyota High-Lux.³⁶ Project vehicles directly benefited the local population as they could carry the sick to hospital, transport goods and help with shopping. Most volunteers however did not appreciate the idea of merely being a 'taxi driver'.³⁷

As a result of all these new experiences, SNV volunteers formed a close-knit organisation, likened to a family, and the coordinators played a parental role.

When Wim Zevenbergen was around and you were visiting Lusaka, it was normal that you would join him at church on Sunday. Even if you were not a churchgoer, you joined him and afterwards you would have a cup of coffee at his home. This was stronger in the early years than later. The first groups were closer. Sint Nicolas was celebrated amongst the groups at a provincial level.³⁸

Another comparison of the spirit of SNV was that of an old-fashioned scout movement. The Dutch Farm, the administrative and recreational SNV centre situated 10 km west of Lusaka, was the volunteers' first port of call in Zambia and was extremely bare, reminiscent of a boarding school. On arrival, some SNV volunteers felt as if they were being treated as minors despite the fact that some of them were in their late twenties.³⁹ Given the SNV tendency to interfere in volunteers' social lives, this sentiment comes as no surprise. At this stage, relationships between volunteers and the local population were forbidden: at least one female volunteer who married locally was asked to leave the organisation.⁴⁰ Another SNV couple who decided to get married needed special permission for the wife to continue her work: 'We were the first volunteers who got married and my wife really wanted to continue to work. We asked why this would be possible. Eventually a specific arrangement was put in place ... Even the Board in the Netherlands had to decide on this matter.'⁴¹ SNV changed this policy in the next period.

Zambianisation and the Paradox of Dependency (1973-1991)

In 1973 Zambia was pronounced a one-party state with the ruling UNIP in full control of the economy and politics. Socialism became the official state ideology. These political changes coincided with a period of economic decline as a result of the worldwide oil crisis, a fall in the price of copper, and Zambia's support to the regional liberation wars. Zambia became more dependent on foreign aid. By 1979, Zambia, despite being the seventh richest of the thirty-nine states in Sub-Saharan Africa, was receiving the tenth largest amount of aid per capita.⁴² In the Netherlands, Zambia enjoyed favoured nation status. Donors implemented programmes with a view to lessening dependency on copper and to counteracting a growing wealth gap between the urban and rural populations. As a result, from 1977 onwards the agricultural sector received more funding than the educational sector.⁴³ Technical assistance grew to 5.3% of the government's budget in 1975 and to 8.5% in 1979.⁴⁴ Foreign aid was by then accounting for 65% of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development's budget.⁴⁵ The tight budget led to the collapse of government-run projects like the provincial farming training centres, while 'aid-backed projects continued and foreign aid emerged in dominant position'.⁴⁶ Most donors supported so-called Integrated Rural Development projects, with the Dutch government specialising in dairy and cattle production. Calls for improved coordination of development efforts led to the introduction of the National Commission for Development Planning, with representations at provincial and district levels. In North-Western and Western Provinces aid now exceeded 50% of government spending.⁴⁷ As Gould observed, UNIP's ambitious rural development policies imploded in the late 1980s under the weight of a complex package of unsustainable subsidies to seed and fertiliser distributors, to commodity producers, to grain transporters, to milling companies, to urban consumers and so on.⁴⁸

SNV Projects

SNV's rural-based activities fitted well in this view of development aid and, as a result, few policy changes occurred in the 1970s. It was a period of shared 'revolutionary zeal' with the socialist government. SNV accepted projects outside the three provinces but stopped its activities in Central Province. SNV health workers were no longer needed in hospitals as a result of the process of Zambianisation and medical volunteers instead worked on the newly established mother and childcare projects in the rural health centres or at specialised health institutions. In 1979, SNV had 54 people in the field; half of whom were engaged in healthcare, the other half in agriculture.⁴⁹ Cooperation with Monze Diocese continued.

As Zambia's economy continued its rapid decline, with high inflation and shortages of all products, SNV's idealism slowly ebbed away, along with its perception of the task of development.

At the time SNV was very idealistic, as in: 'let's just help here and change matters around.' This is something you start doing at the local level. But I think that SNV realised in the course of time that it might be better to work more structurally and at a higher level. Through government or NGOs.⁵⁰

Of course, the change from SNV's grassroots involvement to support for district or provincial government institutions was also a result of the large-scale investment in education. Zambians were now in a position to take over the work at a micro level and were encouraged to do so by government and donor organisations. Expatriate development workers had to climb the ladder and become 'experts' and be more 'professional'. However, it seems that this change did not happen overnight. When Muyoyeta started working for SNV in 1985 she observed the following:

At that time SNV was just sending volunteers, mostly to work with the government. I remember there were a lot of physiotherapists, a lot of people in agriculture, working with the Ministry of Agriculture – planning officers, land surveyors, those kinds of people. Most of them were doing that. Outside of government they were working with youth projects, carpentry projects for youth and that kind of thing. That tended to be mainly what their work was about.⁵¹

In fact, some cynical Zambians argued that SNV volunteers became professionals in name only. One highly educated Zambian commented on SNV's professionalism in the 1990s: 'The behaviour was that of a voluntary organisation and their type of recruiting was also of volunteers.'⁵²

From the mid-1980s onwards, SNV cooperated with the Dutch Embassy (DGIS) on a number of large-scale projects, some of which lasted until the late 1990s. DGIS was the funding agency and SNV acted as its executive. In all these projects, SNV worked in close cooperation with local government departments. The Dutch government did not change its policy regarding assistance to the poorest areas and remained active in Western, North-Western and Luapula Provinces. A new and important trend was SNV's support for district councils. Like British Aid and other organisations, SNV saw the need to assist the administrative decentralisation process at district level. They

did so by attaching advisors to district councils, with the aim of improving planning capacities and managing their income more efficiently.⁵³

SNV was not alone in its endeavours, as it belonged to a group of 26 donor agencies that were active in Zambia's agricultural sector with a total number of 160 projects between them. The danger of scattered development projects, it was later recognised, was an increase in regional disparities and there was the risk of thwarting 'future attempts to develop coherent, national, rural and development planning'.⁵⁴ As discussed earlier, the large number of projects was bound to confuse the local population. An American anthropologist based in Mwinilunga observed the following in the 1980s:

Nearly every year some new group, full of enthusiasm, arrives with new projects aimed at improving social and economic conditions. During my initial periods of field research (1982, 1984-1987), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD), the German Assistance to Zambia Program (GTZ), the British Voluntary Service Overseas (VSO), the Belgian and French group *Médecins sans Frontières* (MSF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organisation (WHO), international Catholic and Protestant relief agencies, local missionary groups, plus various agencies of the national government each had projects in place.⁵⁵

To give an impression of SNV's activities during this period, selected projects are summarised below.

Rural Water for Health Project, North-Western Province

After a prolonged drought in North-Western Province in the early 1980s, the Dutch government introduced a large-scale project to provide wells and boreholes to a number of districts in the province. The aim of the programme changed from drought contingency to the following:

To provide safe and adequate drinking water and sanitation facilities with the aim to improve the health and living conditions of the rural population in above districts, in a manner which will allow the cost for operation and maintenance to be afforded by the community.⁵⁶

Between 1985 and 1990 a total of 108 boreholes were drilled in Kasempa and Solwezi Districts. When the first phase of the project came to the end it met with the following criticism from DGIS.

It has to be admitted that after the not-so-successful first phase, where the emphasis lay on the physical construction of the infrastructure, a proposal has been submitted in which community participation (aimed mainly at maintenance) will be encouraged as well as additional activities such as training and health education. The project may continue but must be closely monitored.⁵⁷

This project is a good case of one in which SNV shifted over time from practical assistance – namely drilling boreholes – to offering advisory services. The drilling of boreholes continued but the emphasis was now on the sustainability of the project and how to organise people and government departments in such a way that they would be able to look after the boreholes and wells once SNV handed them over. While admiring its concept, it was later criticised for its top-down approach. 'There is no

discussion of whether this pattern is viewed as suitable by the community, or whether any other management structure could be more effective, and might require fewer inputs to keep it functioning'.⁵⁸ The local communities, however, did pick up on the idea and 'contributed food for the workers, sand, stones, so they felt it was their well because they contributed a lot to it'.⁵⁹

Masase Agricultural Project (MAP), Western Province

In the late 1970s, the Zambian government initiated Cattle Development Area projects to increase national food production, promote self-sufficiency and improve the income of rural households. The EU, and the German and Dutch governments supported this move.

In this context, the Masase Cattle Development Area was established in 1982 in Sesheke District. The project did not make a big impact due to the limited funds made available to it by the Provincial Capital Budget. It was also recognised that there was a need to consolidate the existing project activities that had already been started and to expand into areas that were not yet covered. All of this required an increased budget and inputs. In 1986 support was secured from DGIS for a period of four years.⁶⁰ SNV was the executive agency and appointed several SNV staff members to the projects. The activities shifted from cattle towards an 'integrated comprehensive approach' in agricultural development. The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, managed the programme through its National Agricultural Area Development Steering Committee.⁶¹ The project came to be known as the Masase Agricultural Project (MAP).

Fisheries Projects, Luapula Province

In 1986, the World Bank released a report on Zambia's fisheries sector and offered support for a four-year project aimed at the rehabilitation of the ice plant in Kashikishi, a stock assessment survey of Lake Mweru and services to the local fishing communities. But Zambia's break with the IMF in 1987 led to the downscaling of the project and the Dutch government agreed to adopt parts of it. The project's overall aim was to help fishermen to increase their standard of living by providing a market in Luapula Province so that they did not have to transport fish themselves.

The ice plant, managed by the Luapula Co-operative Union (ZCU) was rehabilitated with the assistance of SNV. Other activities included support to the Luapula fisheries sector by gaining knowledge about fish stocks. SNV soon realised the need to expand its focus on integrated activities, for example, to encourage fishermen to engage in alternative activities during a fishing ban. These were implemented in the next period.

Provincial and District Planning Unit, Luapula Province

Provincial Planning Units (PPU) were established from 1980 to 1982 as part of the government's decentralisation programme. The SNV programme supporting these PPUs was formulated as follows: 'to improve absorptive capacity to implement projects, need for productive and income-generating projects, need to actively formulate projects for funding, rational exploitation of natural resources, promotion of women integration'. SNV assisted the government in integrating development departments at district level and introduced a section called Women's Affairs within

the PPU. The vision of the Women's Affairs section was 'to promote the integration of women in the development of the province'. This section opened in Mansa in April 1990 and was headed by the coordinator for women's affairs, assisted by an SNV advisor.⁶² Unusually, this proposal was evaluated by a Zambian professional, employed by SNV, who expressed a word of caution concerning SNV's involvement in councils:

Councils are historically, local administration and social services provision institutions with no development attitude towards productive projects. Development planning is not contained in the Local Government Act of 1980 ... in order to involve the personnel and political structure at the district level, they [the old guard] need to be motivated as a whole to appreciate the changing role of District Councils. This is possibly quite involving.⁶³

Cooperation with councils, however, remained a permanent feature of SNV activities in Luapula Province.

Zambezi Cooperative and Agricultural Project (ZCAP), North-Western Province

In 1985, SNV started a small agricultural credit scheme in Zambezi District to provide financial and advisory support geared towards an 'integrated farm approach'. After the first evaluation it was proposed to start a regional development programme for the district aimed at increasing production, the promotion of self-sustained development and the improvement of living conditions.⁶⁴ In 1989, the Netherlands Embassy expressed serious doubts about the economic viability of the project: '[it] should be turned into an economically viable trading company, rather than a farmers' "welfare organisation"'. However, because of the involvement of other parties, like the district agricultural officer and the district veterinary officer, DGIS agreed to provide funding for a period of one year to redirect the project.⁶⁵ SNV played a coordinating role in this.

Tonga Museum and Crafts Project, Choma, Southern Province

A small programme carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture in conjunction with Gossner Mission in Gwembe Valley had an unexpected outcome: a unique collection of Tonga artefacts. Despite the fact that this project was situated outside their concentration area, SNV adopted the project, realising that in addition to the value of the preservation of culture, the production of artefacts created an important source of income for rural households. SNV provided personal assistance to the project in the form of a curator and project manager, with DGIS funding this large-scale project under the Rural Development Programme.⁶⁶ Uniquely, the same SNV advisor managed the project for its entire duration from 1988 to 1997.

Personal Experiences and Zambian Responses

Until the introduction of project aid and professionalisation in the mid-1980s, SNV volunteers continued to work as their predecessors had done. As a result, the characteristics of SNV volunteers were no different from those of the early volunteers. They were young and inexperienced in development work and in general did not have a university degree. But there were some differences. Thus SNV changed its policy

regarding the relationship between SNV volunteers and the local population: every volunteer now carried a box of condoms from the Netherlands.⁶⁷ It also became possible to be recruited as a couple. In 1979, the first Dutch family arrived in Zambia with their two children.⁶⁸

Idealism was still a strong factor. As one volunteer commented: 'It was from that time, the idealism of the 1970s. I don't think people have that any more.'⁶⁹ SNV, which valued the Dutch *inspraak cultuur* (the right to have your say), had long and serious discussions on almost everything. One of the most remarkable points of debate was whether volunteers ought to give part of their 'excess' salary back to SNV.⁷⁰ Another discussion, related to 'luxuries', was the issue of housing: should volunteers live in brick houses or in thatched huts, like the local population? SNV did not intervene in these discussions and people made their own individual choices.

Even if volunteers lived a simple lifestyle, the language barrier and differences in educational levels still created a gap between the local population and the volunteers.

The farmers with whom you cooperated hardly spoke English. The contact you had with those people was very, I believe, quite superficial. Socially, the people you interacted with at the weekend, were often business people or people from the educational sector. They were at a certain level which you could more easily relate to.⁷¹

Despite all their preparations at home, volunteers struggled with cultural differences. One of those was the issue of time-keeping and, related to that, taking time to socialise.

And the time they take for greetings. That's a whole exchange: how are you and your children and your chickens and the weather, etc. After five minutes you're still not finished. We come to someone and say: you have to buy fertiliser and this is the cost. That's a message of one minute and then you want to be off again.⁷²

When language proved not to be the barrier, there were other differences to overcome. As one former SNV nurse commented: 'We are trained to be preventive, they are much more curative. In the beginning we worked in a health centre and the girls prescribed all kinds of things [medicines] while I thought it wasn't necessary. Schoolchildren who came with headache and coughs, but just wanted to avoid going to school... But you couldn't do anything because you were the guest in the country.'⁷³

Some volunteers adapted easily to the local culture while others firmly resisted it. There was an instance where one volunteers after a long trip to meet up with a group of farmers arrived to find them drinking beer. 'I got very angry and said "that's not what I came here to do" and they would say "yes, but your predecessor would join us and drink beer with us the whole day!" I made it clear that I had not come for that.'⁷⁴

The SNV volunteers in the late 1970s and 1980s arrived in a country that was much less carefree than it had been in the early days. As a result of economic decline and regional liberations, wars, tensions and shortages affected the daily lives of the volunteers: 'It was actually not a nice period when we came. It was socialist, and there were a few state-owned shops where you could buy your toothpaste. There was no toilet paper, no flour, and no bread. It was a difficult time. The borders with Zimbabwe were closed, South Africa was boycotted... The atmosphere was actually

not good. If you were white you were under suspicion. You were seen as a [South African or Rhodesian] spy.⁷⁵

In the mid-1980s many changes took place within SNV Zambia as a result of the introduction of project aid and other policy changes. Volunteers were slowly replaced by university-trained development workers.⁷⁶ The new SNV employees had often gained experience in other developing countries. Salaries and housing conditions were adjusted. Inevitably, this also heralded the end of the 'Dutch farm' as a meeting point. The old meeting centre was exchanged for a modest office in Chachacha Road in Lusaka in a deal with the Zambia Council for Social Development.

Perhaps as a result of the professionalisation of development work, SNV became more 'trendy'. Introducing new development concepts from outside seemed to cause a top-down approach. The introduction of the hugely complex concept of gender is one such example. An SNV employee specialised in gender immediately on arrival dismissed the most popular form of cooperation, the women's clubs:

In Zambia the club approach is very widespread, whereby the clubs are supposed to be representing the women. However, clubs include disproportionate numbers of slightly better-off women, usually married, who can afford the luxury of time off for child-care, domestic and agricultural responsibilities.⁷⁷

One would imagine some sort of resistance to this type of judgement but her counterpart at the council later commented on the cooperation as having been positive. 'She was very patient and imparted the skills and everything went well so that at the end of the contract we were very competent.'⁷⁸ This poses the question of whether people accepted the new concept because they were convinced of its use or simply because it was on offer. This issue has led to considerable debate. It is obvious, as Frederick Cooper suggests, that gender programmes risk being used 'only as an 'add on' to a development process otherwise unchanged'.⁷⁹ A Zambian gender specialist hired by SNV for a gender assessment of the Rural Water for Health Programme agreed with Cooper's observation:

If RWHP had chosen to focus on gender, it would have meant creating a programme that would aim at altering the power imbalance process. The Project would have found that it gets drawn into work processes that challenge, criticize, question, identify and scrutinise systems and structures with the main aim of seeing positive change. Whether this change be radical or otherwise. Most of these systems and structures are government. This type of work is political.⁸⁰

In the same context, evaluators wondered if 'it would be of interest to find out how women, who have always been the custodians of traditional water resources, view the change of role when the protected sources are introduced, along with its somewhat cumbersome management structure'.⁸¹

Another such concept, which was somewhat forced, was ownership and sustainability. The answer of one villager, a beneficiary of Rural Water of Health Project after he has been asked whether he had heard of SNV is telling.

SNV was not known, they didn't want people to know that the RWHP was part of a project like SNV. They wanted the community to feel responsible for the wells... we don't know SNV as an organization. We just know RWHP.⁸²

Development work became a specialisation and career opportunity for Zambians. The first Zambian professional joined SNV in 1985. She was a well-known activist and the head of a large women's organisation at the same time and joined SNV as a graduate fresh from university. In the midst of all the policy changes regarding professionalisation and the recruitment of Zambians, she has the distinct impression that SNV was in flux then.

Why do I say SNV wasn't ready for me? There were a lot of issues around what conditions of service I should be offered. Was I volunteer, should I to be offered volunteer conditions of service? That kind of thing. There was a lot going backwards and forwards about my conditions of service and what I should get and what I shouldn't get. My conditions were very different from the Dutch conditions. ... it was a genuine attempt to get a Zambian in, to begin to get a Zambian perspective into the organisation. Whereas I think, before the organisation was a little bit closed, a very tight-knit organisation. Very focused on itself and what it did.⁸³

Other Zambians employed by SNV were drivers who were mostly attached to the large projects. The Zambian support staff was the most permanent factor in the organisation and as a result these people saw many SNV people and projects come and go. The longest-serving driver comments on adjusting to the Dutch culture in daily encounters.

For Zambians it is a strange thing to call each other by the first name. But in Europe it is how you are supposed to call each other. So I used to say 'mister Roy' at the beginning, and he told me: 'stop calling me mister, I am just Roy'. To me it seemed impolite to call someone by his first name. Now I am used to that. Now we all call each other by our first names. But new Zambians coming into the office have to get used to this. We also make intercultural jokes, like putting 'van der' in front of everybody's last name on the blackboard.⁸⁴

The Zambianisation of SNV at a professional level only started to take off in the mid-1990s.

Liberalisation and the Growing Influence of NGOs (1991-2005)

Winning the multi-party election in 1991, the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) under the leadership of former trade unionist Frederick Chiluba put an end to UNIP's socialist experiment. MMD embarked on a policy of economic liberalisation and privatisation and it drastically downsised the civil service. Education and health services, provided for free under UNIP, now attracted a fee. Chiluba was opposed to 'paternalistic aid' and did not want the state to be seen as the 'benevolent father'. The emphasis was on self-help. These changes did not, however, bring the expected results, namely economic growth. Poverty and unemployment were on the increase. While the government was withdrawing from a number of sectors, the NGOs tried to fill the gap they left.⁸⁵ The number of registered NGOs grew from 390 in 1993 to 1500 in 1996.⁸⁶ Dependency on the state, symptomatic of UNIP's days, was replaced with dependency on local and international donor organisations. MMD introduced an agricultural policy aimed at the more successful semi-commercial farmers, which was implemented and backed financially by the donor community.

SNV Projects

SNV followed the general trend of an idealistic voluntary organisation that had become professional: higher qualifications, more experience and better remuneration were all demanded. No longer known as volunteers or development associates, people working for SNV were now called advisors or consultants. Buzzwords from the private sector like marketing, management and clients found their way into the SNV vocabulary. While maintaining a good working relationship with DGIS, SNV was no longer executing its projects by the end of the 1990s.⁸⁷

Despite all these changes, SNV continued its historical involvement in local government within the newly introduced Provincial and District Development Support Programmes. It also remained involved in the projects which had been initiated in the 1980s but that now had to be phased out. Policy changes included concentration on a selected number of districts and technical support to NGOs and community-based organisations regarding existing projects. The period could be defined by the word 'support'. With the closure of the Choma Museum project in 1997, SNV's involvement in Southern Province came to an end.

In 1999, SNV had nineteen different project activities in six 'concentration' districts, subdivided into three programmes: Local Government Support (LGS), Sustainable Economic Development (SED) and Civil Society Support (CSS).

Province	Activity ⁸⁸	District	Starting date	Type of programme
Luapula	District Planning Advice	Nchelenge	1996	LGS
	Fisheries Co-management	Nchelenge	1997	LGS
	Agricultural Advice	Nchelenge	1997	SED
	Groups/association Support	Nchelenge	1992	CSS
	Fisheries Co-management	Samfya	1992	SED
	Organising Samfya for Development	Samfya	1998	CSS
North-Western	Forest Management Advice	Kabompo	1998	SED
	RWHP	Solwezi	1990 [?]	VAR
	District Planning Advice	Mwinilunga	1993	LGS
	Agricultural Advice	Mwinilunga	1996	SED
	ZDT Management Advise	Zambezi	1991	CSS
	YEPP/ZAYO Management Advice	Zambezi	1996	CSS
Western	SAC	Sesheke	1997	CSS
	Cereal Banks	Sesheke/Senanga	1996	SED
	SeshekeNorth Development	Mongu	1996	CSS
	Liangati/CBNRM	Sesheke	1999	SED
	PPS Management	Mongu	1998	CSS
Nation	District Strategic Planning	4 Districts	1998	LGS

What effect did the above-mentioned changes – such as economic liberalisation and a reduced civil service – have on the ongoing projects run by SNV, an organisation which traditionally worked closely with government?

Zambezi Cooperative and Agricultural Project (ZCAP), North-Western Province

The political change in 1991 marked the end of the cooperative movement. Aided by internal struggles within the cooperation itself, this led to the closure of the project in 1992.⁸⁹ In 1996, SNV directed its support towards the Zambezi Development Trust, an NGO that promotes self-sustainable development. SNV assisted by providing training and advice.

Rural Water for Health Project, North-Western Province

This project was badly affected by the political changes and economic decline. The most direct factor was the rising costs of inputs like fuel and cement, which are the major ingredients needed to construct boreholes and wells. Secondly, high inflation created unrest among the Zambian staff. Watching their incomes dwindle by the day, they became less motivated. The poor conditions of service at cooperating government departments bled them dry of people who were looking for greener pastures. Thirdly, the government did not provide financial support for the project from 1999 to the end of the project in 2001. An additional burden on the project was the issue of security: four SNV project vehicles were stolen between 1993 and 1994.

When the project came to a stage where it had to be handed over to the government, SNV was forced to be innovative. It responded by working at strengthening the existing structures of the government departments and local communities. As the costs of drilling boreholes and making wells increased, the emphasis shifted to improving traditional water resources for communities that could not realistically afford modern technology.⁹⁰ As a result, education about hygiene and the use of local wells and traditional water resources gained more prominence.⁹¹

While the project as a whole was considered a success, SNV also realised that the performance of its successor, the Water Sanitation and Health Education (WASHE), would ‘to a large extent depend on the availability of external support from other cooperating partners and their relationship with existing government and private structures, to implement their programme activities and thus justify their existence to local communities’.⁹²

Masase Agricultural Project (MAP), Western Province

In response to farmers’ needs, project activities diversified in this period. Besides the original cattle development programme, SNV expanded into crop husbandry, natural resources and rangeland management, group development, and gender. Management remained in the hands of the Ministry of Agriculture, which assigned 21 field staff and 9 veterinary assistants to the project. In 1994, the project headquarters moved from Masase to Sesheke, the district capital, in order to benefit from the improved communications there.⁹³ MAP was affected by the restructuring of the civil service, putting pressure on the number of extension workers. The government also stopped contributing to the project as stipulated in the contract. Again, SNV chose to emphasise the capacity of the local structures in the final phases. The final report, written by the Department of Agriculture, concluded that ‘the project can claim to

have achieved some successes in improving the food security level of a number of households ... But the Project's foremost "claim to fame" is having built its host organisation ... and their staff. The programme was well integrated into that of its host organisation.⁹⁴ In 1998 the project was handed over and SNV pulled out.

As a result of their experiences with MAP, SNV initiated new projects in Western Province, two of which are outlined below.

Sesheke Advisory Centre (SAC), Western Province

The realisation that the MAP project, as well as initiatives like the Cereal Banks projects,⁹⁵ would not continue unless supported by a strong local institution led to the opening of Sesheke Advisory Centre. Staffed by two SNV advisors – one for management, monitoring and evaluation and the other for gender and training – the goals were formulated as follows: to enhance self-reliance through the provision of technical assistance in the field of institutional development, the empowerment of communities including men and with a special focus on women, and community organisations for relevant development actors operating in the district.⁹⁶ Funded by DGIS for a period of three years, it faced many obstacles. The project closed in 2000 but continued along similar lines in Mongu.

People's Participation Services (PPS), Mongu, Western Province

Initiated by the FAO in 1984, the PPS aim to 'build participatory and sustainable self-help group structures in Western Province serving the interests of the rural poor, particularly women'. In 1994, it consisted of 2000 groups that were mainly involved in income-generating activities on and off the farm.⁹⁷ In the mid-1990s PPS was transformed into an independent NGO and the SNV proposed working with them to integrate all its activities such as the Sesheke Advisory Centre, the Cereal Bank projects, etc. The Dutch Embassy financed this for a period of two years and SNV continued to assist with a part-time management advisory service for a further two-year period.

Projects in Luapula Province

Despite challenges arising from the political and economic changes in Zambia, SNV's involvement in Luapula Province showed a strong sense of continuity until the late 1990s. Its policy centred on two issues: the establishment of efficient and effective District Councils (in line with the government's policy of restructuring the civil service) and assistance for the Ministry of Fisheries in setting up fisheries co-management systems like the Village Management Committees. The consequences of the reduction of Luapula's fish stocks and the annual three-month fishing ban forced SNV to think about increasing local capabilities for monitoring the ban but also about training communities in how to organise alternative means of income generation during this particular period. SNV remained the major shareholder in the Kashikishi Ice Plant, which no longer operated as a cooperative but as a firm called ISABI Investments.

In 2002, SNV unexpectedly pulled out of Luapula Province in spite of the fact that it was still supporting a number of projects that were known to be successful and even

though the province was mentioned in its long-term plans in 2002. As SNV itself did not provide a satisfactory answer as to the reasons for its withdrawal, it is not surprising that rumours surfaced. At this point only informed guesses can be made as to the reason for the decision. There was tension surrounding the sudden departure of an SNV advisor on Mwense District Council and this was aggravated by conflicts in the partisan politics of SNV's cooperating partner in Samfya (see below). Luapula Province was the home of President Chiluba and this could have led to political pressures being put on SNV for local politicians to gain from the fishery industry. Existing conflicts between the SNV director and a Zambian programme officer in Luapula Province could also have contributed to its withdrawal from the province. In any case, SNV Mansa closed its offices for good and moved to Kasama in Northern Province. Former ISABI shareholders said 'We were surprised ... We don't know whether it was conflict or a government problem or whatever but what we could see was just an economic consideration, perhaps they couldn't handle so many offices in all areas.'⁹⁸ And 'I have no idea. I think it's the government that can answer that. Maybe the contract expired or their term of office in Luapula.'⁹⁹ A Samfya council employee said that 'it was a sudden pull-out. That was for the co-funding activity, but maybe they were also strained somewhere on top.'¹⁰⁰ A former Zambian Programme Officer in Luapula Province analysed the situation as follows:

Because SNV did not offer any incentives, eventually the stakeholders ... lost interest. It was also compounded by the fact that at that time the government was restructuring, so a lot of people who were put in those committees quite often ended up being transferred to other places. Eventually, all these projects closed down. And the new management decided they did not want Luapula, which shocked me, because if you look at the resources put there ... and then you take a decision like that, I was extremely surprised.'¹⁰¹

In 2000 SNV underwent an evaluation and a redirecting of its programme. The evaluators summarised their main criticism as follows:

Today all elements of SNV-Zambia's different phases can be found in its programme. Independent (SNV/other donor-sponsored) programme implementers, advisors, managers (and implementers) in ministries, local governments, NGOs, small enterprises, etc. sometimes with substantial additional facilities, sometimes not, sometimes with programme funding from SNV itself, sometimes with funding from third parties. As a result of the mix of approaches, SNV's nature and identity are not clear, either to its clientele, or to its own personnel.'¹⁰²

The result, in the eyes of the evaluators was that 'all present and very diverse expectations by partners are based on some experiences with SNV (staff) and the general "donor" image of any organization from the North involved in (funding) development'.¹⁰³

Even though it was not clear yet what direction SNV would take at this point, it did signalled the end of project work. SNV published a new outline of its activities and in 2002, it stated its aims as follows:

SNV Zambia wants to contribute to poverty alleviation through the strengthening of local governance processes and economic development based on sustainable use of natural resources. It will do so through the facilitation of capacity building processes in local level institutions and organizations primarily in Western Province, North-

Western Province and Luapula Province (1/5th of Zambia's population). Dealing with gender and HIV/AIDS issues will form an integral part of SNV's approach. SNV will provide advisory services and access to knowledge networks through professional development workers on demand in flexible, tailor-made arrangements. [author's emphasis]¹⁰⁴

The themes show a certain degree of continuation in SNV's traditional involvement: local governance, natural-resource management and private-sector development. This period was seen as one of SNV being in an advisory role. Since these developments have not crystallised and SNV is still undergoing many changes, it will be the task of a future historian to describe this period.

Personal Experiences and Zambian Responses

During this period, SNV staff cooperated with large numbers of civil servants at a district level. It is to their experiences that we now turn our attention. In Luapula Province people have positive memories of SNV even though there was frustration about its unexplained departure. And in spite of a riot in Samfya – the result of a violent imposition of the yearly fish ban on local fishermen – the SNV car, which had been handed over to the council after SNV's departure, survived and can still be seen driving around.

To the people who benefited directly from SNV's intervention, the feeling is that of appreciation. People still talk fondly about it, while others express a desire for their return. Others still defend their legacy. An example is when the over-enthusiastic officers in Samfya ended up causing the deaths of three fishermen in an attempt to impose the fish ban. The district fishermen and sympathizers rose in riot and smashed infrastructure belonging to the fisheries department. The only thing they spared was an SNV vehicle!¹⁰⁵

In Mwense District they evaluate SNV's presence as follows. 'Mwense [council] was graded as the best in the province because of the support we received from SNV... Mwense was the only district with the capacity to plan and even manage the resources that were coming from the district.'¹⁰⁶ In Samfya the district expressed misgivings about SNV's decision to refrain from financial support.

The problem we had was funding ... the money they were giving us was very little. And maybe as Zambians, we were expecting a lot from them ... We thought that after getting some training, we might extend those loans or grants but they only ended up providing knowledge and without capital it became very, very difficult.¹⁰⁷

This type of complaint was not only lodged by poorly paid civil servants but also by a businessmen, a former chairperson of ISABI Investments, explaining the collapse of the company as a result of the lack of capital SNV was putting in. 'You buy your fish every day in the form of cash and there is no working capital ... so you need this capital to keep running and you need a market for it which is 400 km away from the fishing area or freezing area.'¹⁰⁸

While people were generally satisfied with SNV's contribution to the water and health sector in North-Western Province, their withdrawal from this particular project has left a big gap.

The government was supposed to take care of funding. SNV left a huge gap because the funding stopped. The wells ran dry, the government had no funds. The communities needed motivation. When something needed to be repaired, who would do it? A hand pump is only sold in Lusaka, costing millions of Kwacha. The communities could not raise that money. SNV left equipment like compressors and generators with Water Affairs. But Water Affairs just handed that equipment out to three districts. Less than 10% of the people that were trained are still working in water industry. In these three districts things are going well, in the other districts things are not as good.¹⁰⁹

It is interesting to note that despite the continued presence of SNV in Solwezi, its activities are not common knowledge among the general public, as can be seen in some of the following remarks: 'I do not know much about them, except that they give agricultural inputs. Since I intend to go into agriculture, I will approach them', and 'I hear they help with loans for the disabled. Anyway, I see their cars everyday and know where their office is.'¹¹⁰

Western Province has been called the 13th Province of the Netherlands, not only as a result of SNV's presence but as a result of a high concentration of Dutch projects, as one Mongu resident observed.

There were many Dutch people living here at that time. They even started an international school. It was mainly for Dutch people. When most of them left, the school continued. The feeling most people had was that the Dutch government had a liking for Western Province. Some even felt that it was being treated as a province of the Netherlands! And a number of our experts had the opportunity to be trained in the Netherlands.¹¹¹

Currently, SNV is one of the few Dutch organisations that has remained in Mongu and is still confronted with the legacy of large Dutch aid projects.¹¹² The change from support to advisory role in this context is more difficult to explain. The phasing out or withdrawing from long-term projects has caused resentment among the local population. As one SNV driver commented:

In the beginning I was working for SNV projects like the Masese agriculture project, the Sesheke advisory centre and Tango. First these projects were sponsored by SNV, but now they stand on their own. The people were very disappointed. Some people came up to me asking why SNV had left. So I went up to the team leader to ask why they had left the projects on their own. He gave me an explanation. I understand and agree with the decision but I find it very difficult for the people. Even today, they don't understand why SNV has left and what capacity building does.¹¹³

A politician and local businessman in Sesheke, highly appreciate SNV's long presence as opposed to most other organisations, felt that it was unrealistic to expect that the infrastructure be handed over to the government and the local population maintain it. In addition, the people targeted for training were civil servants who have since been transferred or have passed away.¹¹⁴ The failure of this handover, which should have contributed to a feeling of empowerment, had the opposite effect: people know that is possible to improve their livelihoods but are made to feel incapable of doing it themselves.¹¹⁵

The Zambianisation of SNV brought to the fore the inequalities between expatriates and local staff, namely a two-tier salary system and differences in housing allowances and the provision of social security. The first Zambian programme officer in Luapula Province was a former civil servant with a PhD in agronomy. Being well-educated, he complained that in 1995 SNV 'was pretending to be a professional organisation ... the mentality was still that of volunteers except for the salaries of the Dutch staff.'¹¹⁶

A similar complaint about differences in status came from another Zambian professional:

When I came as a programme officer, I was the only one not entitled to accommodation because I was based in Lusaka. All the Dutch operating in Lusaka, however, got accommodation through SNV. And so did the Zambian DAs operating outside Lusaka. That was very unfair.¹¹⁷

Again, vehicles played a prominent part in the distrust between Zambians and Dutch SNV personnel.

The director would quite openly make statements like 'he knew people were abusing vehicles' ... they [the Dutch] were always thinking that people were abusing things. So there wasn't a collegial relationship which was quite unfortunate.'¹¹⁸

There were a lot of difficulties within the organisation. There were many differences like for example about transport. According to the Dutch we didn't need a car for a project, while I thought we did need a car. It depended on the field director to what extent they were going to listen to a Zambian. One was very friendly and the other was much more complicated.¹¹⁹

This kind of tension was picked up by the evaluators in 2000 who commented that:

SNV vehicles are seen but activities not shared. SNV was seen as to be operating in isolation. It should attend more meetings, call on local leadership ... SNV Zambia is seen as having a credibility gap between itself and its (some) clients because the organisation gives the impression that it does not trust some of its partners.¹²⁰

Within the organisation itself, the atmosphere changed. SNV as a family concept was gone, as is stated by a Zambian member of staff:

The family culture that SNV used to have was an atmosphere in which everybody knew everybody. We knew each other's partners, children, we had annual meetings and the organisation was much smaller. Now we just work from eight to five and that is it. The social atmosphere has gone. The Dutch and the Zambians used to be one big culture together; there was a lot of interaction going on outside office hours. I find that completely different nowadays.¹²¹

A driver confirms this:

For me there are two SNVs. And I prefer the first one! In the old SNV, you would have dinner at SNV's houses when you were visiting other areas. Things have become more detached at SNV.¹²²

In the late 1990s, SNV rapidly turned into a multinational organisation, not only employing more Zambians but also people from all over Africa. While recognising the need for change, they notice negative aspects of this process too.

The mixed character of the office is good because it shows faith in the capacity of Zambia, but on the other hand uncertainty is being created by these changes. Fear exists because of change within this organisation, also the reduction of Dutch people within the offices creates uncertainty.¹²³

In the beginning when I started working for SNV we had more Dutch people. There were four in Sesheke, two in Senanga and one in Mongu in 1995. Zambians become suspicious because fewer and fewer whites are coming in. To us that is a sign that the organisation is not doing very well! We don't trust each other!¹²⁴

A similar complaint comes from an external consultant who claimed that there is a level of corruption and nepotism in Zambianised organisations. In order for him to get a consultancy job he has to share his earnings:

Local people want cuts in these evaluations. So people like myself don't get jobs for they say how do we ask Gilbert to part with 50% of his earnings? That is bad, not only for myself but also for the perception of the organisation. We should localise personnel and keep them in the culture of that organisation.¹²⁵

A question that can be posed in relation to SNV Zambianisation relates to the general character of the organisation: did the changeover of staff make SNV more Zambian or African in outlook? According to a present member of staff, SNV can still be identified as being Dutch:

... at the end of the day it remains a Dutch organisation. For me the physical presence of a Dutch person gives immediate evidence of perhaps the Dutch origin of the organisation. But it is not the physical presence of a Dutch person, but what the organization represents. What is Dutch, it is the idea of equality, of recognizing the rights of the individuals, also of reducing inequalities. And I find this already in the way our board is structured. Previously there were three board members. There is always negotiation, trying to agree, trying to get a win-win situation, trying to find consensus. That consensus-building culture, I find that typically Dutch. A culture which is not imposing, there is no hierarchy, that's what I find also in the approach to development, this is what we try to achieve. To look at the individual as having the perspective of quality and respect, at individual level.¹²⁶

While not shying away from discussing internal policies, inequalities and directions, SNV always took a conformist stand towards Zambia's government, never challenging its status quo. Ferguson noted:

that the conceptual problematic of development has served, in concrete instances and thought specifiable mechanisms, as what I have termed an 'anti-politics machine', systemically misrecognition and depoliticizing understandings of the lives and problems of people living in...¹²⁷

Some openly criticise SNV's apolitical attitude:

In the process of Zambia becoming poor, not all agreed to that route. There were alternative routes but those routes were not supported even by independent

organizations ... part of development is to invest in innovative way of doing things. You also have organisations like SNV who are doing projects all over the world. There is no transcontinental, trans-country sharing of experience.¹²⁸

Partisan politics in the 1990s resulted in a direct confrontation between SNV and Rev. Betlem Chonde, who was working for SNV's partner organisation Organising Samfya for Development. Chonde was accused of campaigning for an opposition party using SNV resources. The conclusion was that despite the fact that 'there is no evidence indicating that Rev. Chonde has misused SNV/OSD funds or transport for political activities, or used the SNV/OSD umbrella to further his political interest [UPND], he is not allowed to pursue his political campaign in Samfya district.'¹²⁹ The fact that Chonde was campaigning in an area that was heavily dominated by the ruling MMD government might have increased the political pressure on SNV.

Consequences and Memory of SNV's Involvement in Zambia

Most people have become cynical about the impact of development activities and are still looking for the answer to Zambia's perceived problems. Is micro-level input more beneficial than large-scale projects? Should development workers only advise or is hands-on cooperation more productive? Is the development sector to blame for misguided development ideologies or are Zambians just too passive? Ferguson considers these expressions of insecurity as a part of a general trend:

There is a real break with the certainties and expectations that made a development era possible. The "rolling back" of the state, the abandonment of the goal of industrialization, the commitment to what are euphemistically called "market forces" and "private enterprise", and the shattering of expectations for economic convergence with the West, all come together to create a very real end, at least at the level of perceptions and expectations, of at least the grander versions of development projects in Africa.¹³⁰

These uncertainties are especially true for those who experienced Zambia's radical changes: from a relatively wealthy, donor-independent country where government was the actor for change and development to a poor, donor-dependent country with an ineffective government. Former SNV volunteers have become more cynical about development organisations like SNV as they have witnessed little progress. At the same time, they express some nostalgia about the early period in which volunteers were motivated, not by income or status but by idealism. This, in their view, is in sharp contrast to the current situation in which development workers are well paid.

The crucial question is how to measure the impact of development work? Only with the professionalisation of development work were attempts made to study the effectiveness of development activities, mainly through evaluation reports. But evaluators themselves have cast doubt on the possibilities of measuring a non-technical intervention like gender, which is aimed at behavioural change.

Although quite a number of gender related workshops have been organised over the past years, it is impossible to say what effect this had on the participation of villagers, both men and women, in project activities the end of the road to gender equality is barely visible and continuous efforts will have to be made by the project.¹³¹

One evaluator observed that as a result of this vagueness, workshops are often counted as tangible results. Instead of meetings being just a means of achieving the objective, they have become the objective itself.¹³²

What is more interesting for this particular study is the way in which people reviewed their own impact, especially those SNV volunteers who continued their stay in Zambia and after 20 years (or more) of residency have acquired a local perspective. They have the advantage of having experienced long-term developments in Zambia and have had the opportunity to revisit their projects. Most of them emphasise the shortcomings of their past SNV activities. With the benefit of hindsight, they can, for instance, now see that the infrastructure they put in place could never, realistically, have been maintained by the local population, especially in the context of economic decline.¹³³

Both Zambians and SNV volunteers share the idea that at an individual level the cooperation and training was beneficial. However, the structural impact of development work on the basis of these relatively short-term interventions has been questioned.¹³⁴

In reviewing the material, it seems that the most far-reaching and long-term consequences of SNV's activities in Zambia are the unintended ones. SNV has left a group of successful entrepreneurs in Zambia. A number of former SNV volunteers (from the 1960s to early 1980s) took the opportunity to remain in Zambia, either as a result of a local marriage or due to business opportunities. Most of them are active in the agricultural sector: rose-growing for export, meat processing, tobacco processing, farming and coffee exports are all popular amongst this group of former volunteers.¹³⁵ One nurse is still active in the healthcare sector, though she married a commercial farmer, and an anthropologist/artist continues his involvement in Choma museum. Not all are convinced of their effectiveness as development workers but all agree that this early experience benefited them later in their interaction with Zambians in the private sector.

I believe SNV is an organisation from which you can learn a lot, how you deal with the local population. It has benefited me a lot. You learn not to be afraid to get in contact with people from a different culture. At the preparation course you learned how to respect other people and how you perhaps can be the first one to start a discussion ... The big difference between my work now and then is the economic approach.¹³⁶

They also realised that development workers or consultants stayed too limited a period of time to see if people actually benefited from their intervention.¹³⁷ Former volunteers occasionally visit their projects to see what has happened since. Did these visits confirm the idea that Zambia has become a 'graveyard of enthusiastic projects'?¹³⁸

Dirk de Jaeger who worked in Zambia in the 1960s revisited his project first in 1978 and then again in 2000.¹³⁹ During his first visit he noticed that:

... inhabitants somewhat resented that such a helpful team had departed ... the departure of the team had even led to conflicts with the local headman who was accused of not having been active enough to keep the team in the area...¹⁴⁰

Looking back, de Jaeger believes that the project was unrealistic from the beginning as there was very limited potential in this isolated area. In 2000, he visited the area

again and was surprised to still find remnants of the project. Interestingly, Willem Berentz, also a former SNV volunteer, started a farm in the same district and serves as living proof that commercial farming in this remote area is indeed possible.

Witkamp is still actively involved in the Choma museum though DGIS and SNV pulled out in 1997. Having overcome many hurdles over the course of time, the project has finally become a success story.

The project actually succeeded, against all the odds, accidentally succeeded. Also because I stayed. This year we have already sold 60 million kwacha worth of baskets, made by 400 women ... In the end SNV and DGIS can be quite happy with the outcome. We are a tourist attraction; fifteen hundred people visit this place every month.¹⁴¹

Some projects completely disappeared with the pulling-out of the donor organisation, as Pritchett observed in Mwinilunga:

Possessing both Land Rovers and a large truck, which frequently shuttled between Mwinilunga and Solwezi, the project provided a prime transportation link. Farmers who participated in the scheme had access to a wide range of commodities generally scarce in Mwinilunga. They could also pass on information about conditions in Solwezi market and sometimes managed to transport their kin's commodities there... Once the Dutch supervisors and their vehicles left, however, all the advantages disappeared. Farmers found themselves isolated ... on the periphery of the flow of information, goods and services. The remnants of the project quickly faded away.¹⁴²

More such unintended results can be found. The above-mentioned evaluations reveal that in some instances the SNV projects had long-term effects that were only noticed after a period of time. It is therefore all the more astonishing to note that SNV has not kept a record of its long-term participation in Zambia. All the documents quoted in this chapter came from the Netherlands Embassy archives in Lusaka and most of these records will be destroyed in the coming years. While there is evidence of an SNV archive until the late 1990s, nobody can confirm why it no longer exists or explain why records are not kept for longer than three years.

Keeping archives does not only benefit the historian but also serves other important purposes as well: administrative continuation, the creation, expansion and maintenance of networks, background information, and data for presentations and reports that can serve to enhance accountability. When former SNV volunteer Nina Atkins found employment with SNV in the 1990s, no record was found to testify to her previous contract with the organisation. She had to resubmit all her papers. Liswaniso who worked for SNV in the 1990s was never aware that the well-known Muyoyeta preceded her. A former SNV field director had difficulty remembering the reasons for Western Province being a 'concentration' province for the Dutch government and SNV.¹⁴³ In 1999, the SNV field director erroneously held that up to 1989, SNV used to work in seven provinces and that its programme was extremely diversified. She ended her speech by saying that from the steps SNV was taking 'it was clear that SNV was learning from the past'.¹⁴⁴

What could be the reasons for SNV's lack of institutional memory in Zambia? Back in 1984, Wood and Vokes were already suggesting that:

With the turnover of staff ... it is difficult to achieve the necessary continuity for this understanding and sensitivity ... improving institutional memory is one solution to

the problem, but it is a poor substitute for the sensitivity and understanding which can only be built up over time through personal experience.¹⁴⁵

Muyoyeta also blames the high turnover of staff:

... organisations like SNV people come and go so much. So within a short time, their memories go. So within a short time I lost contact with the organisation and moved on to other things ... Brenda (Liswaniso) came with SNV ten years after me. But the strange thing is that I asked her if she knew that I had worked for SNV and she said no. There was absolutely no memory of that. She was really shocked when I told her, because there was no memory of that within the organisation. People move around so much in these organisations.¹⁴⁶

Witkamp links the short stay of SNV staff with a lack of accountability:

People are never confronted with the consequences of their behaviour ... the salary arrives in the bank anyway, there are air tickets, if you become sick you will be repatriated, your children get their education ... And after two or three years you get out of it again. Then you get a replacement who says: 'Gee, what a strange thing Jan did here!' But Jan is already gone, posted to Bolivia, doing something with coffee! As a result, an SNV person will never belong to Zambian society. He/she remains an exotic person, who drives a car, sits at a computer and writes reports.¹⁴⁷

One reason for the hesitancy about keeping SNV's memory alive that was not directly stated by any of those interviewed could be the desire to make a clean break with the past. This tendency comes not solely as a result of bad experiences in certain areas in Zambia but also as what SNV staff conceive to be a total change of character in the organisation. Today's SNV is seen as being entirely unconnected with the SNV of the past. However, despite its new course, SNV cannot deny people, both Zambian citizens and Dutch residents, a memory of 40 years SNV in Zambia.

It proved difficult to reconstruct local memories of SNV in the rural areas, probably as a result of the comings and goings of so many organisations and the transfer of civil servants – the SNV's local counterparts. All the same, one can observe a strong memory of the organisation in the places where SNV was operational over a long period of time. People in the rural areas of Sesheke District still suggest the return of SNV, as it is the only organisation which stayed with them for such a long time.¹⁴⁸ A former Programme Officer states in this context that: 'I think in the areas that SNV works in they are well known ... but in those areas where it doesn't work, they don't know SNV, it's just like any other programme. ... Except new people. People who were there 10 to 15 years ago knew what they were doing.'¹⁴⁹ This was also the finding of the research assistant who travelled through Luapula and North-Western Province:

The overwhelming majority of the people who have heard of SNV are those who have had contact with it. Knowledge about it is scanty on the ground among ordinary residents.¹⁵⁰

Those who worked closely with SNV as employees or counterparts still have fond memories of their cooperation, and hope that SNV will change its current policy and return to the kind of organisation they remember so well. A consultant comments that, unlike other organisations, SNV has a long track record in Zambia.

They have a lot of experience and in a way think they are a leading organisation. SNV would be in the same category as some of these Norwegian, Swedish organisations. At least, there is an element of learning which you don't find in American and British organisations.¹⁵¹

Records are kept for the sake of accountability of past deeds but also for the simple reason that people who had close contact with SNV have an undeniable memory of its continued presence in Zambia. This memory can also be used to SNV's advantage: to prevent the creation of untruths and myths and to network with successful former SNV volunteers.

Interviews and discussions

by Anne-Lot Hoek (a), Besa Mwaba (m), Marja Hinfelaar (h)

1. Godfrey Azuza, Solwezi, 28 July 2005 (a)
2. Nina Atkins, Monze, 14 January 2006 (h)
3. Bas Beek, Lusaka, 24 January 2006 (h)
4. Malambo Blann, Solwezi, 28 July 2005 (a)
5. Chansa Chansa, 23 November 2005 (m)
6. Mwimanj Ndota Chellah, Choma, 3 August 2005 (a)
7. Dr Webster Chikampa, Sesheke, 11 November 2005 (h)
8. Clara Chipoya, Solwezi, 23 November 2005 (m)
9. Paul Chulu, Mansa, 29 September 2005 (m)
10. Sr. Engelbergus, Mongu, 25 August 2005 (a)
11. Willem van de Grinten, Lusaka, 13 January 2006 (h)
12. Dik Ijf, Lusaka, 30 May 2005 (a)
13. Makuni Jairo, Sesheke, 12 November 2005 (h)
14. Henry Kaira, Solwezi, 28 July 2005 (a)
15. Meshias Kabimba and other village people, outside Solwezi, 29 July 2005 (a)
16. Fred Kafumbe, Mansa, 30 September 2005 (m)
17. Ackim Kalembo, Solwezi, 29 July 2005 (a)
18. Adrian Katema, District Planning Officer, Mwense, 3 October 2005 (m)
19. Eugene van Kemenade, Mongu, 23 July 2005 (a)
20. Tomas Killodamo, Solwezi, 29 July 2005 (a)
21. Fred Kosamu, Samfya, 27 September 2005 (m)
22. Henry Kaira, Solwezi, 28 July 2005 (a)
23. Arie de Kwaaisteniet, Lusaka, 31 May 2005 (a)
24. Kusiyo Mbikos Lewanika, Mongu, 22 July 2005 (a)
25. Clement T. Lishibi, Sesheke, 11 November 2005 (h)
26. Brenda Liswaniso, Lusaka, 3 June 2005 (a)
27. Renee Lourens, Lusaka, 26 May 2005 (a)
28. Willem Lublinkhof, Mazabuka, 2 June 2005 and Lusaka, 2 August 2005 (a)
29. Michael Mabenga, Sesheke, 11 November 2005 (h)
30. Sinjan Mukutulu, Sesheke, 11 November 2005 (h)
31. Sibongile Mauye, Solwezi, 29 July 2005 (a)
32. George Mbangula, driver SNV, Mongu, 27 July 2005 (a)
33. Eric de Milliano, Leiden, 27 October 2005 (a)
34. Dr Gilbert Mudenda, consultant, Lusaka, 27 October 2005 (h)
35. John Mulamfu, Mongu, 25 July 2005 (a)
36. Kikilwa Mundiya, Mongu, 22 July 2005 (a)
37. Godfrey Mutokoma, SNV Lusaka, Lusaka-Choma, 3 August 2005 (a)
38. Lucy Muyoyeta, Lusaka, 31 May 2005 (a)
39. Inos Mwale, Lusaka, Zambia, 27 May 2005 (a)
40. David Mwansa, Mansa, 1 October 2005 (m)
41. Maurice Ndobela, Lusaka, 1 June 2005 (a)
42. Charlton Nzie, SNV Mongu, 25 July 2005 (a)
43. Shimon Patel, former chairman ISABI, Mansa, 29 September 2005 (m)
44. Ernest Phiri, Solwezi, 29 July 2005 (a)
45. Carla and Jacob Schoemaker, Lusaka, 25 May 2005 (a)
46. Dr John Siame, Lusaka, 20 September 2005 (h)

47. Daisy Sikateni, Mansa, 30 September 2005 (m)
48. Allen Sinkamba, Sesheke, 12 November 2005 (h)
49. Petra Staal, Lusaka, 8 November 2005 (h)
50. Gerrit Struif, Lusaka, 3 June 2005 (a)
51. Aldert van de Vinne, Lusaka, 24 May 2005 (a)
52. Bert Witkamp, Choma, 3 August 2005 (a)
53. Meindert Witvliet, Amsterdam, 1 April 2005 (a)
54. Wim Wouters, Lusaka, 1 November 2005 (h)
55. Tebuho Yubai, Lusaka, 6 June 2005 (a)
56. Wim Zevenbergen, The Hague, 3 March 2005 (a)
57. Mutinta Zulu, Lusaka, 27 May 2005 (a)

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- Wood, A. & R. Vokes (eds) 1992, *Aiding Development? An Analysis of British Aid to Zambia (1964-1989)*, Leeds: Southern African Studies, No. 11.

¹ I also work on the assumption that as a result of similar changes in other (African) countries, e.g. from socialism after independence to liberalism in the 1990s, SNV adjusted its policies accordingly. However I did not have access to past SNV policy documents to prove this point while compiling this history.

² Besa Mwaba was the research assistant throughout the research project and was responsible for the fieldwork in Luapula Province and Solwezi. Anne-Lot Hoek conducted a number of interviews (for details see the list of interviews), and the author undertook field trips to Sesheke, Monze and Lusaka. I want to thank Giacomo Macola, Inge Brinkman and Anne-lot Hoek for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

³ H.L. Moore & M. Vaughan, *Cutting Down Trees: Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990*, (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1994). Moore & Vaughan call this process 'developing man'. This development was also a result of consultations with the African Welfare Associations who were 'frustrated by [the] poverty and backwardness of their home areas, by the lack of opportunities for advancement, and the lack of any substantial government investment to promote it' (ibid: 129).

⁴ Moore & Vaughan, *Cutting Down Trees*, p. 110. F. Cooper & R. Packard, 'Introduction', in F. Cooper & R. Packard (eds), *International Development and the Social Sciences. Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (Berkeley, Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1997), p. 7.

⁵ Moore & Vaughan, *Cutting Down Trees*, p. 113.

⁶ W. Smith & A. Wood, 'Patterns of Agricultural Development and Foreign Aid to Zambia', *Development and Change*, 15 (1984): 405-34, 409. Interestingly, 'by Independence in 1964 ... African farmers produced 35% of the country's marketed maize, of African cash production, 97% of maize, 98% of groundnuts, 96% of small grains and almost 90% of tobacco came from Central, Eastern, and Southern Provinces.' p. 410.

⁷ Cooper & Packard, *International Development*, p. 7.

⁸ Interview with Wim Wouters, Missionary of Africa (White Fathers), Lusaka, 1 November 2005. Father Wim Wouters recalled that the youth raised money for travel by selling old newspapers and bottle tops.

⁹ Smith & Wood, 'Agricultural Development', p. 413.

¹⁰ A. Wood & R. Vokes (eds), *Aiding Development? An Analysis of British Aid to Zambia (1964-1989)* (Leeds: Southern African Studies, no. 11, 1992), p. 15.

¹¹ 'General Introduction', in K. Crehan & A. von Oppen (eds), *Planners and History: Negotiating 'Development' in the Rural Zambia* (Zambia: Multimedia, 1994), p. 1.

¹² Cooper & Packard, *International Development*, p. 2.

¹³ Netherlands Embassy Archives Lusaka (NEAL) 7512 zambia/os/algemeen/organisaties, SNV Zambia/overeenkomst tussen het koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Republiek Zambia inzake het ter beschikking stellen van Nederlandse vrijwilligers in Zambia/Lusaka/1965-12-17 (Tractatenblad, Jaargang 1966, nr. 92 and 1968, nr. 2), signed by Kenneth Kaunda and F. van Raalte. According to the First Secretary at the Netherlands Embassy, Gerald Lucius, this contract is still valid. The contract states that 'volunteers shall be exempted from all taxes on all sums received as payment for their work, or income from sources outside Zambia'.

¹⁴ Smith & Wood, 'Agricultural Development', p. 424.

¹⁵ *The History of SNV Zambia in Western Province* (typescript, undated, no author, but could be Alfons Fransen), and I. Brinkman, *Bricks, Mortar and Capacity Building 1965-2005: 40 Years of SNV Netherlands Development Organisation* (SNV, The Netherlands, 2005).

¹⁶ Interview with Willem Lublinkhof, Lusaka, 2 June 2005. 'De Youth Service jongeren waren eigenlijk campagne voerders, die gingen vaak de dorpen in om mensen onder druk te zetten dat ze op de Unip partij van Kaunda moesten stemmen. Voor dat werk zouden ze beloond worden door de regering.'

¹⁷ Interview with Arie de Kwaaiestieniet, Lusaka, 31 May 2005. 'SNV heeft zich altijd gevoegd naar de politiek van dat moment, zoals het voortdurend doet. SNV kan hier niet de politiek beïnvloeden, dus SNV greep alle kansen aan om projecten op te starten ...Vanuit SNV was de drive om zoveel mogelijk projecten te beginnen in Zambia en dat kun je alleen maar bereiken door in te haken in de politiek.'

¹⁸ Interview with Meindert Witvliet, Director of Plan Nederland, Amsterdam, 1 April 2005, 'Het werd echt een semi-militaire organisatie. Toen zijn wij er als SNV uitgetrokken.'

¹⁹ SNV Annual Report Zambia 1968, p. 3.

²⁰ Interview with Wim Zevenbergen, The Hague, 3 March 2005.

²¹ D. Jaeger, 'A Case Study of a Community Development-Aid Project in a Remote Part of Zambia', in *ZGA Handbook Series, No. 8* (Lusaka, 1980), p. 161. At the same time it was envisaged that the project would be handed over to the government and the team would be made indispensable within a period of 6 to 8 years. The project lasted until 1973.

²² Interview with Nina Atkins, Monze, 14 January 2006. See also interview with Carla and Jacob Schoemaker, Lusaka, 25 May 2005. 'We had good infrastructure, there was always transport. We both had a car and a motorcycle and that was very important. Many people could not work on government projects because they did not have the means.' ('We hadden een goede infrastructuur, er was altijd transport. We hadden allebei een auto en een motorfiets en dat was heel belangrijk. Er waren een heleboel mensen die niet konden werken in overheidsprojecten omdat de middelen er niet waren.')

²³ Geographical Division: Luapula (18), Lusaka (15) and North-Western Province (17).

²⁴ Interview with Willem van de Grinten, Lusaka, 13 January 2006 and an interview with Renee Lourens, Lusaka, 26 May 2005, about the late 1970s.

²⁵ Wood & Vokes, *Aiding Development?*, p. 15. In 1965: 1972, decline in 1978: 845 to 222 in 1989.

²⁶ Interview with Sister Engelbergus, 25 August 2005. Additional testimonies about the issue of differentiation can be found in the following periods.

²⁷ *Vice Versa*, no. 5, 1967, p. 11. Article by Ambassador J.A.M. Beelaert van Blokland, 'De gedegen opleiding van de vrijwilligers geeft hun onmiskenbaar overwicht. Daarbij komt hun bereidheid datgene te doen wat hun hand vindt om te in deze uiterste primitieve gemeenschap in dit wijdde land.' Interview Schoemakers (2005). 'We did not know beforehand that there was commercial agriculture here.' (We wisten voordat we hier kwamen niet dat hier commerciële landbouw was.)

²⁸ M. Kerklaan (ed.), *Het Einde van eenTijdperk: 130 jaar Persoonlijke Belevissen van Nederlandse Missionarissen*, (Baarn: Ambo 1992), p. 128. 'Op werken onder mensen, van geheel andere gewoonten, gebruiken en religies, waren we niet voorbereid. Wat wist je van culturen? In onze begrippen had cultuur iets met kunst te maken. En voor ons was er maar een juiste manier van leven, de westerse manier. De rest van de wereld was onderontwikkeld.'

²⁹ Interview Willem Lublinkhof, Mazabuka, 2 June 2005. 'Daar zaten zulke fantastische mensen tussen, die deden het niet voor hun salaris, daar zat echt een roeping tussen.'

³⁰ Interview Arie de Kwaaisteniet, Lusaka, 31 May 2005. 'Ik ging graag naar de dorpen toe waar de werknemers van de projecten vandaan kwamen. Ik kwam daar een keer in zo'n dorp terecht bij iemand waarmee ik goed overweg kon op werk. Maar toen kwam ik bij hem en toen zei hij: 'je mag wel komen, je bent van harte welkom, maar ik wil niet hebben dat je probeert mijn dorp te veranderen. Dat doen wij op een project, maar waar ik woon niet.'

³¹ Interview van de Grinten (2006).

³² Interview Dik IJf, Lusaka, 30 May 2005. 'Er werd ons wel eens verweten dat als we een village elder per ongeluk voorbij reden er geen lift aangeboden werd door ons.'

³³ Interview Willem Lublinkhof, Lusaka, 2 August 2005. After SNV, Lublinkhof went on to establish one of Zambia's largest farms and still resides in Zambia today.

³⁴ Jaeger, 'Community Development-Aid Project', p. 163-64.

³⁵ Interview Witvliet (2005) 'Voor de Zambianen was er geen verschil tussen ons als SNV'ers en de oud-kolonialen. Als je daar als jong broekje komt en je rijdt in een dikke landrover en kan alles kopen wat je wilt, ondanks je maar tien pond in de maand verdienden, maar je kon declareren, je kon alles doen en je hebt iemand die je eten en je was doet, maakt het voor die bevolking niets uit wie je bent. Die keken naar ons van: oh daar heb je die blanke. Je moet niet de illussie hebben dat ze anders tegen ons aankeken dan tegen die blanke boeren, echt niet. Dat leidde tot discussies en een beetje tot spanning ook.'

³⁶ Interview Wouters (2005).

³⁷ SNV Zambia Annual Report 1970-1973.

³⁸ Interview Witvliet (2005). 'Toen Wim Zevenbergen er was en je naar Lusaka kwam, dan was het gebruikelijk dat je 's zondags met hem meeking naar de kerk. Ondanks dat je niet kerkelijk was, je ging toch mee want daarna gingen we met zijn allen koffie drinken bij hem thuis. Dat was in de beginjaren natuurlijk sterker dan daarna. Die eerste groepen waren hechter. Sinterklaas vierden we onderling, provinciaal.'

³⁹ Interview Atkins (2006).

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Interview Witvliet (2005). 'Wij waren de eerste vrijwilligers die gingen trouwen en mijn vrouw wilde graag blijven werken. Toen kreeg je echt een beetje een probleem, want dat kon helemaal niet. Wij vroegen waarom dat niet zou kunnen. Uiteindelijk is er een specifieke regeling voor getroffen ... Zelfs het bestuur in Nederland heeft daarover moeten oordelen.'

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- ⁴² Smith & Wood, 'Patterns of Agricultural Development' (1984), p. 415.
- ⁴³ Ibid. p. 416.
- ⁴⁴ F. Roos, 'External Aid Agency', in K. Woldring (ed.), *Beyond Political Independence: Zambia's Development Predicament in the 1980s*, (Berlin/New York: Mouton 1984), pp. 221-31.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 222.
- ⁴⁶ Smith & Wood, 'Patterns of Agricultural Development' p. 417-18.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 429.
- ⁴⁸ J. Gould, 'Chiefs, Politics and State Formation in Zambia's Third Republic' (unpublished paper, 2005), p. 3.
- ⁴⁹ Reaching 63 volunteers in 1980.
- ⁵⁰ Interview Lourens (2005). 'In die tijd was SNV heel idealistisch, we gaan hier de boel wel even helpen en veranderen. Dat doe je op lokaal niveau. Ik denk dat SNV er in de loop van de jaren ook achter is gekomen dat je dingen beter structureel op een hoger niveau kan aanpakken. Via overheid of NGO's.'
- ⁵¹ Interview Lucy Muyoyeta, Lusaka, 31 May 2005.
- ⁵² Interview Dr John Siame, 20 September 2005. This was observed in 1995. Some former SNV volunteers became 'professional' on the basis of their former experience and additional studies.
- ⁵³ Wood & Vokes, *Aiding Development?*, p. 64
- ⁵⁴ Smith & Wood, 'Patterns of Agricultural Development', pp. 404-34, 404.
- ⁵⁵ J.A. Pritchett, *The Lunda-Ndemba: Style, Change and Social Transformation in South Central Africa*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), p. 45.
- ⁵⁶ NEAL, Lus Zambia/2013/00074, RWHP Phase 3/1996-07-01 – 1999-12-31 SNV 1995-1999, RWHP January-March 1997, First Quarterly Progress Report (implemented by the Department of Water Affairs with technical assistance from SNV, DGIS funds, administered by SNV), April 1997, Solwezi.
- ⁵⁷ NEAL, Lus/Zambia/2006/00145 SNV Project 'Rural Water for Health' from December 1987 to July 1989, Memorandum 4 February 1988 RWHP SNV-Zambia. 'Gesteld moet worden dat na de niet zo succesvolle 1ste fase, waarin de nadruk lag op de realisatie van de fysieke infrastructuur, er nu een voorstel ligt waarin de gemeenschappelijke participatie (o.a. gericht op het onderhoud) sterk wordt bevorderd – aanpalende activiteiten: training and gezondheids voorlichting. Project kan door gaan maar moet sterk gemonitord worden.'
- ⁵⁸ NEAL, Lus/2019/00028, RWHP Phase 2, 1992-1996, RWHP Mid-Term Review October 1994 by A. Hussen and S.E. Sutton. This report was based on extensive consultation with the villagers concerned and chiefs. The chiefs did not object to the elected committees as such.
- ⁵⁹ Interview Clara Chipoya, Solwezi, 23 November 2005. Her views are shared by another former RWHP employee, Chansa Chansa (Solwezi, 23 November 2005). The above-mentioned assessments, written by outsiders, are more critical about the success of the local water management committees.
- ⁶⁰ Memorandum 4 February 1988 RWHP SNV-Zambia, p. 4.
- ⁶¹ NEAL, Lus/2006/402 Masase Agricultural Project Phase II, 1990-1993, Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fish (MAFF)/SNV, Project Report for MAP at Sesheke District in the W-Province, p. 2.
- ⁶² NEAL, Lus 2006/203 Provincial Planning Unit (PPU), Luapula/SNV 1989-1993, Work plan of the Women Section – PPU Mansa by SNV 1990 (draft).
- ⁶³ NEAL, Lus 2006/203 Provincial Planning Unit (PPU), Luapula/SNV 1989-1993 Comments from M.V. Liswaniso to PPU senior staff, July 1989 'Comments on Luapula DPU Project Proposal'.
- ⁶⁴ NEAL, Lus/2006/201 North-Western Cooperative Union (ZCAP) Vol. I August 1988 – May 1990, Status Report.
- ⁶⁵ NEAL, Lus/2006/201 North-Western Cooperative Union (ZCAP) Vol. I August 1988 – May 1990, Response of Royal Netherlands Embassy to project proposal: G.J. Tempelman (First Secretary), to Resident Representative SNV Mr. H. Bergsma, Lusaka 3 November 1989.
- ⁶⁶ NEAL, Lus/Zambia/2006/00103, Tonga Museum and Crafts project (tmcp), Phase ii, 1992-1994, Memorandum for B. Witkamp (Project Manager) to H. Bergsma (SNV Director), 8 June 1992.
- ⁶⁷ Interview Schoemaker (2005)
- ⁶⁸ Interview Aldert van de Vinne, Lusaka, 24 May 2005.
- ⁶⁹ Schoemaker, (2005). They added that 'idealism wasn't necessarily seen as a positive aspect: I was too idealistic and than you fall very hard! They are not waiting for you here and that was my expectation before I came here. Ik was te idealistisch en dan val je op je bek! Ze zitten echt niet op je te wachten hier en dat dacht ik van tevoren wel. Ik heb een goeie opleiding, ik heb wel wat te bieden, maar nee, dat werkt niet zo. Maar dat was ook van die tijd, het idealisme van de zeventiger jaren. Ik denk dat mensen dat nu ook niet meer hebben.'

⁷⁰ Interview van de Vinne (2005). This issue was raised in connection with the 1981 *bezuinigingen* (savings) in the Netherlands under Prime Minister van Agt.

⁷¹ Interview Lourens (2005). 'Die mensen waar je mee werkte, die boeren spraken bijna geen Engels. Het contact dat je met die mensen had, was denk ik wel heel erg oppervlakkig. Sociaal gezien, de mensen die je in het weekend op feesten tegenkwam, dat waren vaak zakenlui of mensen die in het onderwijs zaten. Die waren meer op een niveau waar wij makkelijker mee om konden gaan.'

⁷² Interview Lourens (2005) 'En de tijd nemen voor bijvoorbeeld groeten. Bij hun is dat een hele uitwisseling: hoe gaat het met jou en met je kinderen en met de kippen en hoe is het weer etc. Na vijf minuten ben je nog niet klaar. Wij komen naar iemand toe en wij zeggen: je moet kunstmest kopen en dat kost zoveel. Dat is een mededeling van een minuut en daarna wil je weer wegwezen.'

⁷³ Interview Schoemaker (2005) 'Wij zijn veel meer preventief opgeleid, zij zijn veel curatiever. In het begin werkten we in een polikliniek en die meiden schreven van alles voor terwijl ik zou zeggen dat dat allemaal niet hoefde. Schoolkinderen die met hoofdpijn kwamen en hoestklachten, dat was allemaal spijbelen... Maar je kon er niets mee, want je was toch wel een gast in zo'n land.'

⁷⁴ Interview Schoemaker (2005) 'Dan werd ik helemaal kwaad: "daarvoor kom ik hier niet!"' Dan zeiden ze: "Ja maar je voorganger ging er lekker bij zitten en met ons bier drinken de hele dag! Dan gaf ik aan dat ik daarvoor niet kwam."

⁷⁵ Interview Schoemaker (2005). 'Het was eigenlijk geen leuke tijd dat we kwamen. Het was een socialistisch, een paar staatswinkels waar je tandpasta kon halen. Er was geen toiletpapier, geen bloem, geen brood. Het was een slechte tijd. De grenzen met Zimbabwe zaten dicht, Zuid-Afrika werd geboycot... De sfeer was eigenlijk niet zo goed. Alles wat blank was, was verdacht. Je werd als spion gezien.'

⁷⁶ Some former SNV volunteers became 'professional' on the basis of their former experience and additional studies, see van de Grinten (2006) and Witvliet (2005).

⁷⁷ NEAL, Lus 2006/203 Provincial Planning Unit (PPU), Luapula/SNV 1989-1993, Project Report of the Gender Planning Section at the Provincial Planning Unit in the Luapula Province, Mansa, 1991.

⁷⁸ Interview Daisy Sikateni, Mansa, 30 September 2005.

⁷⁹ Cooper & Packard, 'Introduction', p. 25.

⁸⁰ NEAL, Lus/Zambia/2013/00076, RWHP 1996-1999, Gender Impact Assessment Report on RWHP-NW Province by Sydia Nduna, 7-21 July 1994.

⁸¹ NEAL, Lus/2019/00028, RWHP Phase 2, 1992-1996, RWHP Mid-Term Review October 1994 by A. Hussen & S.E. Sutton.

⁸² Interview Meshias Kabimba and other village people, 29 July 2005, outside Solwezi around a village well.

⁸³ Interview Muyoyeta, May 2005.

⁸⁴ Interview Inos Mwale, Lusaka, Zambia, 27 May 2005.

⁸⁵ Crehan & von Oppen, 'Introduction', p. 5.

⁸⁶ 'Crossroads', p. 10. Of the 1500 NGOs, 360 were humanitarian, others professional, recreational, cultural/religious.

⁸⁷ The relationship between DGIS and SNV was not without tensions. The cause of conflicts can be traced to differences in status, feelings of superiority (DGIS over SNV and vice versa) and personality clashes.

⁸⁸ NEAL, lus/Zambia/2007/00221 Algemeen ondersteunend/achtergrond informatie ter kennisname inzake activiteiten nederlandse ontwikkelingsorganisatie SNV 1997-2001. At the Crossroads: Role and Identity of a Technical Assistance Organisation in Zambia Today. Review of SNV (Netherlands Development Organisation), February 2000, Vol. I, Main Report by M. Maimbolwa, H.M. Muyoyeta & J. Reynders, p. 14. Total finance provided by SNV 1996-1999: Dfl. 7,358,000, external funding (for projects like RWHP, SAC, Cereal Banks and PPS) Dfl. 3,797,000.

⁸⁹ NEAL, lus/2006/202, SNV Project North-Western Cooperative Union (ZCAP) Part II, June 1990, P. de Kock Regional Office Kaoma to H. Bergsma, 18 December 1991. 'Henri and Karen [SNV] have been expressing many doubts on the quality and integrity of the Union (in case the GM and the Board).'

⁹⁰ NEAL, Lus/Zambia/2013/00079 RWHP III 1996-1999, RITS Research into Improvement of Traditional Water Sources, March 2000 by SWL consultants, UK, N-Washe Lusaka a KAR Research Project funded by DFID, p. 3, 7.

⁹¹ Interview Petra Staal, Lusaka, 8 November 2005.

⁹² NEAL, RWHP Phase 3/1996-07-01 – 1999-12-31 SNV 1995-1999/lus Zambia/2013/00074, Annual Plan and Budget 1999 (November 1998, Solwezi).

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- ⁹³ NEAL, Lus 2009/147 MAP Phase III 1994-1996, Report of the Self-Evaluation of Masase Agricultural Project 1987-1996, p. 31. SNV now started distributing leaflets in Lozi, the local language, explaining its activities.
- ⁹⁴ NEAL, Lus/2009/148 MAP Phase III 1994-1996, Report of the Self-Evaluation of Masase Agricultural Project 1987-1996: 10 Years of Grassroots Development, p. 32.
- ⁹⁵ Cereal Banks: a village organisation that handles grain for food security or marketing.
- ⁹⁶ NEAL, Lus/Zambia/2022/00013 Sesheke Advisory Centre (SAC) 1997-1999/SNV, Sesheke Advisory Centre, Sesheke District, Project Proposal SNV/Western Province, Mongu, Sept. 1996 (final draft), p. 9.
- ⁹⁷ NEAL, Lus/Zambia/2009/00014 People's Participation Services 1997-1999/SNV, FAO/Government Cooperative Program Project of the Government of Zambia (Draft Project Document) 'Support to the People's Participation in ASIP'.
- ⁹⁸ Interview David Mwansa, Mansa, 1 October 2005. David was a board member of ISABI Investments.
- ⁹⁹ Interview Shimon Patel, Mansa, 29 September 2005. Patel is a former chairman of ISABI Investments.
- ¹⁰⁰ Interview Fred Kosamu, Samfya, 27 September 2005.
- ¹⁰¹ Interview Siame (2005).
- ¹⁰² NEAL, 'At the Crossroads', p. 40.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid. p. 41.
- ¹⁰⁴ NEAL, Lus/Zambia/2007/00221 Algemeen ondersteunend/achtergrond informatie ter kennisname inzake activiteiten nederlandse ontwikkelingsorganisatie SNV 1997-2001, SNV Zambia CMAP (Country Multi-Annual Plan) 2002-2004.
- ¹⁰⁵ Besa Mwaba, 'The Way Back': Report on my Luapula Assignment (27 September-5 October 2005), 27 October 2005.
- ¹⁰⁶ Interview Adrian Katema, District Planning Officer, Mwense, 3 October 2005.
- ¹⁰⁷ Interview Fred Kosamu, Community Development Officer, Samfya 27 September 2005.
- ¹⁰⁸ Interview Shimon Patel, former chairman ISABI, Mansa, 29 September 2005.
- ¹⁰⁹ Interview with Henry Kaira, Solwezi, 28 July 2005.
- ¹¹⁰ Notes from Besa Mwaba on RWHP report, 10 January 2005, based on conversations with a travelling businessman, a guest-house manager, a sales lady and a registry clerk.
- ¹¹¹ Interview Kusiyo Mbikos Lewanika, Mongu, 22 July 2005.
- ¹¹² Interview Bas Beek, Lusaka, 4 January 2006.
- ¹¹³ Interview with Charlton Nzie, SNV Mongu, 25 July 2005.
- ¹¹⁴ The collapse of the health sector and the HIV/AIDS epidemic have had serious consequences for the issue of memory in SNV. Many people who worked with SNV have since passed away.
- ¹¹⁵ Discussion with MMD chairperson Michael Mubenga and Sinjan Mukutulu, former Drug Enforcement Commissioner and local businessman, Sesheke, 11 November 2005. Both men have relatives in the area which received support from SNV.
- ¹¹⁶ Interview Dr John Siame, Lusaka, 20 September 2005.
- ¹¹⁷ Interview with Brenda Liswaniso, Lusaka, 3 June 2005.
- ¹¹⁸ Interview Siame (2005).
- ¹¹⁹ Interview with Tebuho Yubai, Lusaka, 6 June 2005.
- ¹²⁰ NEAL, 'At the Crossroads', p. 56.
- ¹²¹ Interview Mutinta Zulu, Lusaka, 27 May 2005.
- ¹²² Interview with Godfrey Mutokoma, SNV Lusaka, Lusaka-Choma, 3 August 2005.
- ¹²³ Interview with Mutinta Zulu (2005).
- ¹²⁴ Interview with George Mbangula, driver SNV, Mongu, 27 July 2005.
- ¹²⁵ Interview Dr Gilbert. Mudenda, consultant, Lusaka, 27 October 2005.
- ¹²⁶ Interview with Sibongile Maue, Solwezi, 29 July 2005.
- ¹²⁷ J. Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity. Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (University of California Press, 1999), p. 248.
- ¹²⁸ Interview Mudenda (2005).
- ¹²⁹ NEAL, lus/Zambia/2011/00123 Toezen op en rapporteren voortgang ontwikkelingsprojecten Nederlandse ontwikkelingsorganisatie (SNV) 1997-2000.
- ¹³⁰ Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity*, p. 247.
- ¹³¹ NEAL, Netherlands Embassy Archives Lusaka, lus Zambia/2013/00074/559 RWHP Phase III/1996-07-01 – 1999-12-31 SNV 1995-1999, Annual Plan and Budget 1999 (November 1998, Solwezi), p. 11.
- ¹³² Interview Mudenda (2005).

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- ¹³³ Interview Kwaaiteniet (2005). 'Maar het opzetten van een infrastructuur, scholen en klinieken, achteraf is me duidelijk geworden dat het allemaal amateuristisch of weinig doordacht werd opgezet. Er werd bijvoorbeeld geen rekening gehouden met hoe mensen aan water zouden komen. Er werd dan een waterleiding stelsel aangelegd wat ik dan weer deed als bouwkundige. Maar toen het op een gegeven moment financieel minder goed ging, was er geen geld meer om de waterleidingen te onderhouden. Zambianen waren toen zeker nog niet zo ver om zo'n systeem over te nemen.'
- ¹³⁴ Interview Makuni Jairo, Sesheke, 12 November 2005. In relation to the market linkage programme, he commented that 'people started to take it on and then they pulled out'.
- ¹³⁵ Interview Lublinkhof (who employs 2000 people), Kwaaiteniet, Schoemakers, Lourens, van de Vinne, Ijf, Atkins, Witkamp, article by Berentz in *Zambia Nieuwsbrief* (2005).
- ¹³⁶ Interview Lublinkhof (2005). 'Ik denk dat SNV een organisatie is waar je heel veel kunt leren, hoe je met mensen, de plaatselijke bevolking om kunt gaan. Het heeft mij veel baat gedaan. Je leert dat je niet bang hoeft te zijn om in contact te komen met mensen van een andere cultuur. Bij de opleiding leer je andere mensen te respecteren en hoe je misschien als eerste over de brug komt om met discussies te beginnen... Het grote verschil tussen mijn werk toen en nu is eigenlijk de economische aanpak.'
- ¹³⁷ Interview van de Vinne (2005).
- ¹³⁸ Discussions with Rev. H. Hinfelaar, Lusaka, 2005.
- ¹³⁹ D. Jaeger, 'Ups and Downs in Rural Development', *Inside Zambia (1964-2004)*, (Werkgroep Zambia 2004), pp. 21-31.
- ¹⁴⁰ Jaeger, 'Community Development-Aid Project', p. 173. Moreover, 'expectations had been raised for the population which have not been fulfilled'.
- ¹⁴¹ Interview Witkamp (2005). 'Dit project is eigenlijk gelukt, tegen wil en dank zou ik willen zeggen, per ongeluk gelukt. Omdat ik hier toevallig ben blijven hangen ... We hebben dit jaar (tot nu toe) van 400 dames voor 60 miljoen aan kwacha aan mandjes verkocht. Uiteindelijk kan SNV of DGIS daar best gelukkig mee zijn. We zijn een toeristische attractie, vijftienhonderd mensen per maand bezoeken het terrein.'
- ¹⁴² Pritchett, *The Lunda-Ndembu*, p. 70.
- ¹⁴³ Interview Eric de Milliano, Leiden, 27 October 2005.
- ¹⁴⁴ NEAL, 'At the Crossroads', Volume II, p. 23. Stakeholders' Workshop, Kafue Gorge, 26 November 1999.
- ¹⁴⁵ Wood & Vokes, *Aiding Development?*, p. 70.
- ¹⁴⁶ Interview Muyoyeta (2005).
- ¹⁴⁷ Interview Witkamp (2005) 'Deze mensen worden namelijk vrijwel nooit geconfronteerd met de gevolgen van hun eigen gedrag ... het salaris komt toch wel op de bank, de vliegtickets zijn er ook, word je ziek, word je meteen terug gevlogen, scholen voor de kinderen ... En na die twee, drie jaar stap je er weer uit. Dan krijg je een ander die zegt: jeetje wat heeft Jan dit toch raar in mekaar gezet? Ja Jan zit alweer in Bolivia, doet nu iets met koffie!... . Een SNV'er wordt nooit een onderdeel van de Zambiaanse gemeenschap. Het blijft een exotisch persoon die in een auto rondrijdt en achter een computer zit en rapporten schrijft.'
- ¹⁴⁸ Comment by Zambia Wildlife Foundation, in a discussion in Mwandi (old Sesheke),
- ¹⁴⁹ Interview Siame (2005).
- ¹⁵⁰ Besa Mwaba, 'The Way Back': Report on my Luapula Assignment (27 September-5 October 2005), p. 11.
- ¹⁵¹ Interview Mudenda (2005).